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Courts: Jurors Dissenting on Special Verdict Issue
Excluded from Subsequent Deliberations
On June 12, 1971, while trimming trees with his father's help,
Scott Ferguson came in contact with an uninsulated 8000 volt
power line which ran along an easement at the rear of their back
yard. Scott and his father brought suit against Northern States
Power Company (NSP) seeking to recover for Scott's personal
injuries and his father's consequential damages. The case was
submitted to the jury on a special verdict asking them to make
findings on theories of negligence' and strict liability based on
trespass. Both theories were ultimately rejected, that of trespass
unanimously, and that of negligence with some dissension. In
answering the questions submitted on the issue of negligence,'
the jury unanimously found both plaintiffs causally negligent,
but only ten of the twelve jurors agreed that NSP had been
causally negligent. The jury then unanimously apportioned the
negligence, finding both Scott and his father substantially more
at fault than NSP.3 On the plaintiff's appeal from a verdict in
favor of defendant, 4 the Minnesota supreme court reversed and
remanded for a new trial, holding, inter alia,5 that:
1. Because of the severe economic consequences the abrupt imposi-
tion of such a rule would have on small electric utilities, the court
declined to decide whether maintenance of an uninsulated high-voltage
power line through a residential area constituted an ultra-hazardous
activity. The court did, however, call upon the legislature to consider
the problem. Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 239 N.W.2d 190,
194 (Minn. 1976).
2. The court never explicitly set out the contents of the interroga-
tories, but the gist of the questions was nevertheless plain: With respect
to negligence, the jury was asked to decide first, whether each party
was causally negligent; second, if more than one was causally negligent,
what percentage of negligence was assignable to each; and third, what
damages were suffered. 239 N.W.2d at 193.
3. Instead of apportioning the total negligence between the three
parties, the jury, per instructions which the Supreme Court found
erroneous, see note 5 infra, first compared the negligence of Scott alone
to that of NSP and found Scott 70 percent negligent and NSP 30 percent
negligent; then it compared Mr. Ferguson's negligence to NSP's and
found Mr. Ferguson 75 percent negligent and NSP 25 percent negligent.
4. The Minnesota comparative negligence statute, MmN. STAT. §
604.01 (1976), requires that, in order for plaintiff to recover, his negli-
gence must not be "as great as that of [defendantl." Since both plain-
tiffs herein were found substantially more negligent than the defendant,
they were not entitled to recover.
5. In addition to the issue of juror participation in deliberations
discussed in this comment, the court found three other improprieties.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
[T]he jury should be instructed, in the event of a five-sixths
verdict, that those jurors who dissent from a finding of causal
negligence on the part of one or more of the parties are dis-
qualified from participating in the apportionment of causal
negligence.
Ferguson v. Northern States Power Company, 239 N.W.2d 190,
196 (Minn. 1976).
A substantial majority of the states presently have constitu-
tional and/or statutory provisions allowing non-unanimous jury
verdicts.6 Such provisions are designed to limit the power of
individual jurors to hang juries and thereby alleviate the burden
of multiple trials on courts and litigants.7 Though in theory
simple and straightforward, non-unanimous jury rules have
created new problems that courts, seeking at once to implement
First, the court held that the procedure by which the apportionment
question was submitted, see note 2 supra, was inconsistent with both
the comparative negligence statute and the interpretive case law set
out in Winge v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 294 Minn. 399, 201 N.W.2d
259 (1972). The court held that the jury should have apportioned 100
percent of the causal negligence among all three parties, rather than
comparing the defendant to each plaintiff individually. Second, the
court held that the jury should have been instructed that, "in a case such
as this, involving a dangerous instrumentality and a great disparity in
risks, they should, in order to fairly and accurately apportion causal
negligence" give special consideration to this disparity. 239 N.W.2d
at 195. Specifically, the court held that since transmission of high
voltage electricity is a highly dangerous activity, the power com-
pany must be held to a high degree of care while the layman need only
exercise ordinary care. As a consequence, plaintiffs could not be
deemed contributorily negligent unless defendant could show that they
were "negligent in the face of danger." Id. at 194. Third, the court
found that certain elements of defense counsel's summation were
beyond the bounds of propriety and not conducive to a fair trial. Id.
at 196-97.
6. The allowable proportions vary substantially including simple
majority, e.g., Wyo. R. Civ. P. 48 (by stipulation of the parties), two-
thirds, e.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-5105 (1964), three quarters, e.g.,
CAL. CoNsT. art. 1 § 7, CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE § 613 (West 1967), and five-
sixths, e.g., N.J. STAT. AwN. § 2A:80-2 (1952). Although Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. § 546.17 (1976), and Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1125
(1943), allow a verdict to be rendered by five-sixths of the jury, they
require that such verdicts can only be accepted after six hours of
deliberation.
7. See Naumburg v. Wagner, 81 N.M. 242, 465 P.2d 521 "(Ct. App.
1970); State (F) v. M., 96 N.J. Super. 335, 233 A.2d 65 (1967); Kronzer
& O'Quinn, Let's Return to Majority Rule in Civil Jury Cases, 8 Hous.
L. REv. 302 (1970); Siddens, Smaller Juries and Non-unanimity: Analysis
and Proposed Revision of the Ohio Jury System, 43 U. CnqN. L. REv. 583
(1974),
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the rules and yet preserve the integrity of the jury system,8
have been hard pressed to resolve.
These problems typically arise when a case is submitted to a
jury on a special verdict or on a general verdict with interroga-
tories. In such cases the jurors must consider and agree upon
answers to a series of questions, each of which is critical
to, and perhaps independently determinative of, the final out-
come.0 If a unanimous verdict is required, no confusion arises,
for if the jurors fail to agree unanimously on the answer to any
question essential to the general verdict, the jury is hung, and
the case must be retried. But if a non-unanimous verdict is
permitted, two jurors may dissent from the majority finding on
one issue while two others dissent on another. Thus, though the
answer to each question has the avowed support of ten jurors,
only eight jurors have agreed on all the answers necessary to a
particular general verdict. The question then is whether a ver-
dict so rendered is acceptable under a five-sixth jury verdict
provision.10
8. Though it has long been settled that there are no federal con-
stitutional bars to non-unanimous verdicts, see, e.g., Southern Ry. v.
City of Durham, 266 U.S. 178 (1924), it has often been argued that non-
unanimity itself is a serious threat to the integrity of the jury system.
See, e.g., Frank, The Case for the Retention of the Unanimous Civil Jury,
15 DrPAuL L. REv. 403 (1966).
9. For example, a negative answer to the question of whether
defendant was causally negligent determines the entire verdict. Sim-
ilarly, under a statute that requires that defendant be found "more"
negligent than plaintiff in order for plaintiff to recover, a finding that
defendant was "less" negligent is also determinative. On the other hand,
certain answers are not independently determinative of the general
verdict but are nevertheless critical to it. For example, a finding that
defendant was 80 percent negligent will not by itself determine the
verdict, but it is clear that the amount of plaintiff's recovery is directly
dependent on it and that any other proportion would, given a certain
amount of damages, produce a different general verdict.
10. There are at least three conceptually distinct forms in which
this problem can arise:
Type A. Both plaintiff and defendant are found causally negligent by
votes of 10 to 2, but jurors A and B dissent with respect to plaintiff, and
C and D dissent with respect to defendant. The concurrence of any of
these four jurors in an apportionment of that negligence gives rise to an
insoluble inconsistency. Moreover, the answers are not only inconsistent
with each other but also with the general verdict: one supports it and
one derogates it.
Type B. Both plaintiff and defendant are unanimously found causally
negligent, but jurors A and B dissent from the apportionment, and C and
D dissent from the amount of damages. In this situation the inconsist-
ency is more subtle. There is no reason why a juror could not, quite
consistently, agree to a proportion of negligence and disagree on the
19761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The courts that have faced this issue have reached various
conclusions." Only two states, Washington' 2 and New Jersey, 3
have adopted, without reservation,' 4 the rule that such verdicts
amount of damage or vice versa. Yet, there remains an inconsistency
with the general verdict. For example, suppose the majority found
plaintiff 20 percent negligent, defendant 80 percent negligent, and that
plaintiff's damages were $10,000.00. Where the comparative negligence
statute dictates that the general verdict shall be computed by reducing
plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of negligence attributed to him,
varying either the percentage or the amount of damages will change
the verdict. Thus, none of the four jurors can be said to support the
general verdict: for A and B would have altered the proportion of negli-
gence attributable to each party and C and D would have altered the
base figure of damages.
Type C. This situation involves the converse of type B, where the
answers to interrogatories are inconsistent with each other but never-
theless support the general verdict. Both plaintiff and defendant are
found causally negligent, but jurors A and B would have found no
causal negligence on the part of defendant. Jurors C and D dissent from
an apportionment scheme allocating 20 percent negligence to defendant
and 80 percent to plaintiff. It is plain that the concurrence of A and B
in the apportionment contradicts their dissent from the finding of
causal negligence on the part of the defendant. Yet, assuming this case
arose in a jurisdiction that has a comparative negligence statute requir-
ing that plaintiff be less negligent than defendant in order to recover,
both of the answers given by A and B support a general verdict in favor
of defendant.
11. Conflicting cases arise even within the same jurisdiction. Com-
pare, e.g., Fleischhacker v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Wis.
215, 79 N.W.2d 817 (1956) and Hupf v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 12
Wis. 2d 176, 107 N.W.2d 185 (1961) with Vogt v. Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 716, 151 N.W.2d 713 (1967) and
Lobrecki v. King, 40 Wis. 2d 226, 182 N.W.2d 226 (1971). Compare also
Simpson v. Springer, 74 Ohio App. 142, 57 N.E.2d 517 (1943) with
Plaster v. Akron Union Passenger Depot, 101 Ohio App. 27, 137 N.E.2d
624 (1955).
12. Bullock v. Yakima Valley Transp. Co., 108 Wash. 413, 184 P.
641 (1919).
13. Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super. 351, 258 A.2d 379 (App. Div.
1969).
14. The position of the Washington supreme court on this point is
unequivocal. In Johnson v. Mobile Crane Co., 1 Wash. App. 642, 463 P.2d
250 (1970), two jurors dissented from a finding which was necessary but
not sufficient to hold the defendant liable. Two different jurors voted
against the general verdict in favor of plaintiff, but the necessary ten
votes were achieved when the first two dissenters joined the majority.
Despite the fact that there were no grounds for finding defendant liable
without a ruling favorable to plaintiff on the first issue, the court upheld
the verdict and in so doing explicitly countenanced inconsistent voting.
Id. at 651, 463 P.2d at 256. Washington apparently stands alone in this
position.
The issue of how to handle inconsistent votes is not as clear in New
Jersey, however. The court in Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super. 351,
238 A.2d 379 (App. Div. 1969), faced with a type B verdict, see note 10
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are valid.' 5  New Mexico16 and Arkansas' 7 have upheld such
verdicts in cases where two jurors dissented from a finding of
causal negligence on the part of one party and two other jurors
dissented on the amount of damages. Both, however, have ex-
plicitly reserved the possibility that votes by a single juror that
stand in fundamental contradiction to each other might be un-
acceptable.' 8 Since neither of these states has been presented
with a situation wherein two jurors dissent from a finding of
negligence and then agree with the finding on apportionment,
supra, wherein two jurors dissented on negligence and two others dis-
sented on damages, concluded that homogeneity in jury voting was not
necessary. Although the court had never ruled on a type A verdict, see
note 10 supra, no reservation was made for the possibility of disallowing
truly inconsistent votes. Compare the Arkansas and New Mexico rules
described in the text accompanying notes 16-18 infra. It is possible,
however, that when a type A verdict arises, the New Jersey court may
retreat from its present position. For a discussion of why such a retreat
might be advisable, see note 49 infra.
15. The rationale for this view is based on judicial interpretation of
the word "verdict" in statutes authorizing a fraction of the jury to
return a verdict. The jury is viewed solely as a fact finder, and the
answer to each question of fact therefore becomes "a verdict." Thus
each interrogatory is treated as a separate and distinct issue. Having
rendered its verdict, the jury reforms and considers the next issue.
Each juror is permitted to examine this new issue without regard to his
vote on the preceding questions. See Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super.
351, 258 A.2d 379 (App. Div. 1969); Bullock v. Yakima Valley Transp.
Co., 108 Wash. 413, 184 P. 641 (1919); Comment, Vote Distribution in
Non-Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 27 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 360, 365 (1970).
16. Naumburg v. Wagner, 81 N.M. 242, 465 P.2d 521 (1970).
17. McChristian v. Hooten, 245 Ark. 1045, 436 S.W.2d 844 (1969).
18. Both courts have implied that they might require consistency
in a juror's votes. In Naumburg the court noted that "[we construe]
Rule 48(b) to mean that any ten jurors are necessary and sufficient to
agree on any issue, so long as none of these jurors has voted incon-
sistently." 81 N.M. at 245, 465 P.2d at 524 (1970) (emphasis added).
Similarly in McChristian the court stated:
We shall not attempt a fine distinction between the ... laws
of Wisconsin and those of Arkansas for the reason that the dif-
ference in the language used makes the distinction obvious;
and for the further and primary reason that we find no conflict
between the findings of the jurors ....
245 Ark. at 1052, 436 S.W.2d at 848 (1969) (emphasis added). The Mc-
Christian opinion is more than a little confusing on this point. The
Arkansas statute provided that a valid verdict would be reached when
"as many as nine jurors" agree to an answer. The case involved a type
B verdict, see note 10 supra, where the answers of the juror in question
were not inconsistent. At the outset the court said that this lack of
inconsistency was the "primary" reason for holding the verdict valid,
id., but later in the opinion it said that the language of the statute
merely required the assent of any nine jurors to each question. 245 Ark.
at 1053, 436 S.W.2d at 849.
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it is possible that such contradictory votes would be deemed
invalid.
All other courts that have considered the question have held
that if the same ten jurors do not agree on all issues necessary
to a verdict, the verdict is invalid as contrary to the legislative
intent underlying the non-unanimous jury statutes.' 9 These
states require that a quorum20 composed of the same jurors agree
to the answer to each question necessary to the general verdict.2 '
19. See State Highway Dep't v. Pinner, 531 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.
1975); Murphy v. Roger Sherman Transfer Co., 62 Misc. 2d 960, 310
N.Y.S.2d 891 1970); Baxter v. Tankersley, 416 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. App.
1967); Clark v. Strain, 212 Ore. 357, 319 P.2d 940 (1958); Plaster v. Akron
Union Passenger Depot, 101 Ohio App. 27, 137 N.E.2d 624 (1955); Dick
v. Heisler, 184 Wis. 77, 108 N.W. 734 (1924); Earl v. Times-Mirror Co.,
185 Cal. 165, 196 P. 57 (1921); Barker v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 89 Kan.
573, 132 P. 156 (1913). But see Simpson v. Springer, 74 Ohio App. 142,
57 N.E.2d 517 (1943).
Again, as in the case of the minority view, see note 15 supra, the
rationale for this rule derives from an interpretation of the word "ver-
dict." The majority position, however, is based upon the idea that the
most important item is the'final verdict; it is the function of a jury to
settle a dispute between two parties. This rationale therefore requires
that a final verdict have the support of the statutorily mandated quorum
'of jurors. Any particular general verdict implies particular answers to
each of its elements. See notes 9 & 10 supra. In order to say that any
particular juror supports that verdict he must have agreed to the major-
ity answer to all of the elements. See Murphy v. Roger Sherman Trans-
fer Co., 62 Misc. 2d 960, 310 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1970); Dick v. Heisler, 184 Wis.
77, 198 N.W. 734 (1924); 3 Wis. L. REV. 51 (1924).
Thus, this is basically a problem of statutory construction; the issue
would be best resolved by legislatures since they, and not the courts,
are equipped to consider the competing policies and to clarify their own
intentions. Both Wisconsin and Texas have taken steps in this direc-
tion. The Wisconsin five-sixths jury statute itself requires that the
same ten jurors agree to the answer to each question necessary to the
general verdict. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.25(1) (West 1957). Texas has
accomplished the same thing in a court promulgated rule of civil pro-
cedure which reads: "A verdict may be rendered in any cause by con-
currence, as to each and all answers made, of the same ten members of
an original jury of twelve.. . ." TEXAs RuLEs AiwlN. 292 (Veron
Supp. 1976). While it may be more desirable for the legislature to
resolve such an issue, the state supreme court in its rule-making capacity
can at least weigh the competing interests involved independent of the
facts of a particular case, and this is probably a better alternative than
to rely solely on decisional law.
20. The size of the required "quorum"-whether seven, eight, nine,
or ten jurors-will, of course, vary depending upon whether the applic-
able statute requires a simple majority or two-thirds, three-fourths, or
five-sixths of the jurors. See note 6 supra.
21. The key phrase in this rule is "necessary to support the general
verdict." Such a caveat would logically imply that only verdicts of
types A and B, see note 10 supra, wherein votes in question do not sup-
port the general verdict, would be subject to attack. Type C verdicts,
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This rule in effect disenfranchises any juror who dissents from
a finding necessary to the verdict. Although such jurors are not
actually forbidden to vote, their votes will not be counted when
the court examines the record to determine if the necessary
number of jurors supported the general verdict.22
An interesting problem arising out of this disenfranchise-
ment, which has received remarkably little consideration, 23 con-
cerns the nature of the role such disenfranchised jurors are to
play in subsequent deliberations. If they are deprived of an
effective vote, must they also be deprived of the right to
deliberate?24 The Minnesota court in Ferguson was the first
court of record to answer this question in the affirmative.
Although Minnesota adopted a five-sixths jury rule in 1913,25
the issues of homogeneity in voting and participation in delib-
erations first arose in Ferguson.26 Nevertheless, the court
bypassed the issue of homogeneity in voting and held that a juror
wherein both answers to the interrogatories, though they contradict each
other, nevertheless support the general verdict, would be immune. The
better reasoned decisions have observed these conceptual differences.
See, e.g., Lorbecki v. King, 40 Wis. 2d 226, 182 N.W.2d 226 (1971); Vogt v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 716, 151 N.W.2d
713 (1967). See generally Comment, Vote Distribution in Non-Unani-
mous Jury Verdicts, 27 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 360 (1970). But the presence
in even the best decisions of the statement that "the same ten jurors
must agree to every question!' has led some courts into an overly
mechanistic application of the rule in which the importance of these
conceptual distinctions is lost. See note 33 infra. See also Scipior v.
Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948) (all jurors agreed that defend-
ant was negligent, but the verdict was held to be defective because the
same ten jurors did not agree as to the particular act of negligence).
22. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
23. But see Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super. 351, 258 A.2d 379
(App. Div. 1969); Comment, Vote Distribution in Non-Unanimous Jury
Verdicts, 27 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 360 (1970).
24. Such a question can only arise, of course, in a jurisdiction
which is willing to disallow at least some inconsistent votes. It would
be illogical to bar a juror from participating in deliberations on a ques-
tion when his vote may be counted to achieve the statutory number of
assents on that issue. Thus, in a jurisdiction which ignores inconsist-
ency in voting, a juror would never be precluded from participating in
any phase of the deliberations.
25. Minnesota Laws 1913, ch. 63. The present text of the statute
reads as follows:
In any civil action or proceeding in any court of record the jury
therein may return a verdict after six hours of deliberation, upon
an agreement by five-sixths of its number. The jury's delibera-
tion commences when the officer in charge of the jury is sworn.
The clerk records that time.
MAim. STAT. § 546.17 (1976).
26. 239 N.W.2d at 196.
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dissenting from a finding of causal negligence was precluded
from participating in the deliberations on apportionment.
In Ferguson the issues of the plaintiffs' causal negligence
and apportionment were decided unanimously, and only two
jurors dissented from the finding of causal negligence on the
part of the defendant. Thus, each of the findings necessary to
the general verdict for defendant2 7 clearly had the support of
the same ten jurors, and the voting pattern was completely un-
objectionable under the five-sixths jury verdict statute. It is
clear, therefore, that the court's purpose in disqualifying dis-
senting jurors from "participation in the apportionment of causal
negligence"28 was not to require homogeneity in jury voting, but
rather to exclude jurors who dissent from a finding of causal
negligence from participation in deliberations on the question of
apportionment. The court stated that "[i] n the give and take of
jury deliberations, the participation of two jurors inclined to
attribute only minimal negligence to [defendant] would appear
-to be prejudicial to the plaintiff."29
The court based this ruling solely on a Wisconsin decision,
Fleischhacker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 9
The Fleischhacker jury found both the plaintiff and the defend-
ant causally negligent, but a different pair of jurors dissented
from each finding. Causal negligence was unanimously appor-
tioned 20 percent to defendant and 80 percent 'to plaintiff, and
judgment was entered for the defendant.31 On defendant's
appeal from the grant of plaintiff's motion for a new trial,
the plaintiff argued that, since fout jurors had found no causal
negligence on the part of one party or the other, only eight
jurors could be said to have agreed to assign some causal negli-
gence to each party. Therefore, plaintiff argued, the appor-
tionment, upon which the verdict was based, did not have
the support of the required number of jurors. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin agreed, holding that "jurors who dissent from
a finding of negligence or its causality . . . are disqualified
from answering the question of comparative negligence."32
27. See note 4 supra.
28. 239 N.W.2d at 196.
29. Id. at 196 n.9.
30. 274 Wis. 215, 79 N.W.2d 817 (1956).
31. The Wisconsin comparative negligence statute in effect when
Fleischhacker was decided, Wis. STAT. Axn. § 895.045 (West's 1966),
required that plaintiff be found less negligent than defendant in order
to recover.
32. 274 Wis. at 220, 79 N.W.2d at 820 (1959) (emphasis added).
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CASE COMMENT
It was upon this language that the Ferguson court rested its
conclusion that jurors who dissent from a finding of causal
negligence should be excluded from the deliberations on the
apportionment issue. Clearly, however, the rule laid down in
Fleischhacker relates only to the propriety of counting funda-
mentally inconsistent votes in determining whether the final
verdict has the support of ten jurors, and does not address the
issue of participation. The court ruled only that if, in the final
analysis, a juror retained his belief that a party had not been
causally negligent, then his vote on apportionment could not be
counted.33
Only three cases from other jurisdictions deal explicitly with
the problem of excluding jurors from participation in delibera-
tions,3 4 and they hold that jurors should not be excluded. Two,
33. Since all four of the dissenting Fleischhacker jurors had found
either one party or the other not causally negligent, the apportionment
aspect of the verdict could only have the support of eight jurors. Thus,
the verdict was not supported by five-sixths of the jurors and could not
stand.
While the logic of the Wisconsin position may well have merit, in
most instances, see note 19 supra, its relevance to the particular findings
in the case may be fairly questioned. The Wisconsin comparative negli-
gence statute permitted the plaintiff to recover only if he was found
less negligent than the defendant, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West
1966). Eight members of the jury found plaintiff 80 percent negligent.
Two of the dissenting jurors, by finding that the defendant was free of
causal negligence, in effect said that plaintiff was 100 percent negligent.
Thus, it is clear that 10 of the jurors found facts that precluded plain-
tiffs recovery. In such a situation it seems illogical to insist that the
plaintiff has been denied a fair trial. If the dissenting jurors had found
him 20 percent less negligent than they did, the verdict would unques-
tionably have been valid. It is perverse to suggest that a plaintiff should
be able to bring a second action because two jurors found him exces-
sively negligent.
Moreover, this aspect of Fleischhaclcer has apparently been over-
ruled sub voce. In Lorbecki v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 463, 182 N.W.2d 226
(1971), the court stated:
[J]uror Mouton would have gone further than the rest of thejury and found the defendant not causally negligent at all.
Since the verdict as a whole was in favor of the defendants, the
dissent as to defendant-King's negligence and causation can
only be interpreted as evincing juror Mouton's belief that the
verdict should have been for the defendants "only more so,"
.... Excluding [Mouton's] answer to the comparison [wherein
she agreed to an apportionment of some negligence to defend-
ant] would result in the anomaly of allowing the plaintiff to
secure a new trial because of a failure which was not prejudicial
to him.
Id. at 468, 182 N.W.2d at 229. See also Vogt v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pac. R. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 716, 151 N.W.2d 713 (1967).
34. In Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Ore. 521, 414 P.2d 797 (1966), the
Court was asked to pass on the trial court's failure to give the following
instructions:
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Naumburg v. Wagner"5 and Ward v. Weekes,36 arose in jurisdic-
tions following the minority position that a juror's dissent does
not preclude his voting on subsequent issues.37 The refusal of
these courts to exclude jurors from deliberations is not surprising,
for such an exclusion would be irreconcilable with the position
that inconsistent votes may be counted.38 The third case was
decided in California, where courts have consistently held that
the votes of jurors who dissented from a finding on any issue
essential to the verdict could not be counted as supporting the
verdict.3 9 In Schoenbach v. Key City Transit Lines40 an inter-
mediate California appeals court explicitly approved a jury in-
struction stating that "until nine or more of the jurors have
agreed upon a verdict which includes both liability and the
amount of damages, all twelve of you should continue to par-
ticipate in the deliberations." 41
Each of you should deliberate and vote on each issue to be
decided. For example, let us assume that against your own
personal judgment and vote, nine or more jurors might decide
that plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. Even though that
decision would have been against your personal vote, you will
have both the right and duty to deliberate and vote on the ques-
tion of the amount of damages.
Id. at 531, 414 P.2d at 801. The court held that the refusal to give the
instruction was not improper-but it did so only on the ground that a
juror's vote on damages would be superfluous had he voted for no
liability. The court refused to address the issue of whether the dis-
senting juror (s) could participate in the discussions.
35. 81 N.M. 242, 465 P.2d 521 (1970).
36. 107 N.J. Super. 351, 258 A.2d 379 (App. Div. 1969). It is inter-
esting to note that the court in Ward was seeking to illustrate that
adherence to the majority rule would be ill-advised. The court rea-
soned that if it disenfranchised certain jurors it might be forced also
to eliminate them from deliberations. Such an idea seemed so entirely
"unwarranted" that the court felt it was a good argument against adopt-
ing the majority rule.
37. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 24 supra.
39. Nelson v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 2d 119, 78 P.2d 1037
(1938); Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 165, 196 P. 57 (1921).
40. 168 Cal. App. 2d 302, 335 P.2d 725 (1959).
41. 168 Cal. App. 2d at 305, 335 P.2d at 726-27. The court did not
give a rationale for its decision, but relied upon Carlin v. Prickett, 81
Cal. App. 2d 688, 184 P.2d 945 (1947), an appeal from a jury instruction
that only the nine .people who found for plaintiff could participate in
fixing the amount of the verdict. The supreme court in Carlin never
ruled on whether such an instruction was erroneous, but relied instead
on the fact that the trial judge had subsequently altered his instruction
to allow all 12 members to participate in the deliberations. The court
held that even if the original instruction was erroneous, the error was
cured by the subsequent revision. The Schoenbach court reasoned that
the supreme court would have held the exclusion of the dissenting jurors
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Thus, every court that has explicitly addressed the issue has
rejected the conclusion of Ferguson. Moreover, since all jurors
are almost certain to participate in all phases of the delibera-
tions absent a specific instruction to the contrary, it weighs
heavily against the Ferguson holding that none of the courts
applying the statutory requirement of voting homogeneity in a
non-unanimous verdict have felt it necessary to advise the lower
courts that dissenting jurors should be excluded from some of
the deliberations once they have cast a certain vote. Only in
Minnesota does a "no" vote on the issue of one party's causal
negligence operate to exclude a juror from the deliberations on
apportionment.
The Ferguson holding also runs directly contrary to the
rationale of the Minnesota supreme court's own decision in John-
son v. Holzmer.42 In that case a juror became ill during the
deliberations and had to be excused. The court held that the
five-sixths jury rule did not authorize the court, absent consent
of the parties, to accept a verdict rendered with only eleven jurors
participating in the deliberations, despite the fact that the re-
maining eleven jurors were unanimous on every question. The
court emphasized the importance of having all twelve jurors par-
ticipate in the deliberations and pointed out that, depending upon
the powers of logic and persuasion of the juror who was dis-
missed, the outcome of the deliberations might have been
entirely altered had that juror participated. 43  It is equally
possible that if those jurors who dissent from a finding of causal
negligence participate in the apportionment deliberations a very
different verdict will result.
to be improper, but the language of Carlin does not compel such a
result.
42. 263 Minn. 227, 116 N.W.2d 673 (1962).
43. While it is true that [under MnTNasoTA STATUTES § 546.17
(1964)] the court may accept the concurring opinion of five-
sixths of the members of the panel .... this does not mean
that the deliberations of the panel leading up to such a verdict
may be conducted by less than a jury of 12. It is not too un-
reasonable to contemplate that in the instant case if the panel
of 12 jurors had continued its deliberations the five-sixths ver-
dict might never have been reached; or even that a verdict
entirely opposite in effect might have ultimately been returned
by the full panel. This would be entirely dependent upon the
powers of logic and persuasion possessed by any one of the
panel of 12.
Id. at 235, 116 N.W.2d at 678. Accord, Measeck v. Noble, 9 App. Div. 2d
19, 189 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1959); cf. Florzak v. Hempstead Bus Corp., 29
N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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Not only was the conclusion reached in Ferguson unneces-
sary to a disposition of the case4 - and unsupported by any prece-
dent, but the two rationales relied upon by -the court were
seriously defective. The first of these rationales was that to
allow a juror who believes one party to be innocent of causal
negligence to participate in the apportionment deliberations
would be "prejudicial" to the other party.45 While it is no doubt
true that allowing jurors who feel that defendant is less at fault
than plaintiff to participate in deliberations will be disadvan-
tageous to the plaintiff, the term prejudicial, in the judicial
sense, means more than disadvantageous.4 6 The essence of "prej-
udice" is that it works a substantial injustice. It cannot be
seriously contended that the participation of jurors who support
one party over the other works a substantial injustice against the
disfavored party. Moreover, the court failed to recognize the
obvious prejudice the defendant would suffer by the exclusion
of the jurors most inclined to favor him.
The court's second theory was that the existence and appor-
tionment of causal negligence actually represents a unitary
issue;47 that is, a juror's finding of no causal negligence would
necessarily incorporate his views on apportionment. This ration-
ale does provide a logical, if not unassailable,48 basis for resolving
-the question of whether the final verdict has the support of the
statutorily mandated quorum of jurors. When a juror votes in
44. The court cited three other improprieties that together would
certainly have been sufficient to warrant a reversal without even con:-
sidering the question of deliberations. See note 5 supra.
45. 239 N.W.2d at 196 n.9.
46. Though "prejudicial" has often been defined simply as dis-
advantageous, harmful, hurtful. or injurious, see, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Grillon, 101 N.J. Super. 322, 331, 244 A.2d 322, 326 (1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 105 N.J. Super. 254, 251 A.2d 777 (App. Div. 1969), the
essence of the term is that an act or ruling is unjustly harmful. In State
v. McCarthy, 130 Conn. 101, 31 A.2d 921 (1943), defendant claimed that
a joint trial with a co-defendant would be prejudicial to his cause.
The court, in rejecting this claim said that "the phrase 'prejudicial to
the rights of the parties,' means something more than that a joint trial
will probably be less advantageous to the accused .... The controlling
question is whether it appears that a joint trial will probably result in a
substantial injustice." Id. at 103, 31 A.2d at 923. The concept of "sub-
stantial injustice" is the core of "prejudide" in the judicial sense. Thus,
it can hardly be said with any force that the participation by a juror
inclined to favor defendant works a prejudice against plaintiff. The
exclusion of such jurors may, however, work a true injustice to the
defendant.
47. 239 N.W.2d at 196.
48. See note 49 infra.
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favor of finding a party not causally negligent, he cannot, con-
sistently, vote to allocate some proportion of negligence to him.
Only one of those two votes can represent the juror's finding on
the issue of liability, and without inquiring, it is impossible for
the court to know exactly how that juror felt about the situa-
tion.49 But extending that rationale to exclude a juror from
the apportionment deliberations ignores the fact that, until the
court accepts the verdict and dismisses the jury, nothing is final.
Each juror has the prerogative, even the duty, to change his
answer to any question if convinced that his initial impression
was incorrect.5" Perhaps even more important, that juror, espe-
cially if he represents a minority position, also has the right and
49. A plausible argument can be made for ignoring the inconsistency
between a negative vote on the question of the existence of causal neg-
ligence and a vote in favor of an apportionment. It is rooted in the
conception of the "existence" question as being merely a part of the
unitary apportionment question. Much of the debate surrounding type
A verdicts, see note 10 supra, could be vitiated by a rule that would, in
the case of conflict between answers to the existence and apportionment
questions, consider the vote on apportionment as controlling. The
rationale for such a rule lies in the fact that the apportionment question
is answered only after more extensive debate among the jurors; that thejuror in question voted in favor of the apportionment; that the most
likely explanation is that he changed his mind after benefit of full delib-
erations; and that to require a juror, having changed his mind, to go
back and alter his answer to the existence question ( which is not in fact
independent of the apportionment question) is excessively mechanistic
and exalts, without reason, form over substance.
The flaw in this argument, however, lies in the assumption that the
juror truly agreed that the apportionment for which he voted was a
fair estimate of the actual relative fault. It is at least possible that his
vote represents not so much agreement as an effort to minimize the
proportion of negligence attributed to the party he favors. That is,
assuming the juror remained unconvinced that one party is guilty of any
causal negligence, it is possible that he "agreed" to a particular appor-
tionment since it was the lowest one his fellow jurors were willing to
accept. The juror, thinking that allocation of some negligence to the
party he favors is inevitable, opts for the lowest available figure in
order to forestall the possible imposition of a higher one. It would be
impossible for a court to rule out this possibility, and to the extent that
we still require some sort of intellectual agreement among jurors and
reject pure compromise, the existence of this possibility precludes a
court from saying with assurance that the verdict has the actual support
of that juror.
Probably the best way to deal with these cases is for trial judges and
lawyers to watch for these discrepancies when examining the verdict;
it is relatively easy to point out the problem to the jury and to explain
to those jurors who voted inconsistently that they must resolve the
contradiction one way or the other.
50. Cf. Shultz v. Monterey, 232 Ore. 421, 375 P.2d 829 (1962);
Marsero v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 268, 74
A.2d 328 (App. Div. 1950); Cullen v. Minneapolis, 201 Minn. 102, 275
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duty to make his views known and to attempt to persuade other
jurors to adopt them.51
As a practical matter, Ferguson's extension of the Fleisch-
hacker rationale may have several deleterious effects. First, it
will tend to inflate artificially the proportion of causal negli-
gence attributed to the party favored by the excluded jurors.
Should those jurors participate in the allocation deliberations
they can be expected to adduce most strongly the arguments
tending to minimize that party's responsibility,52 regardless of
whether their final votes are to be counted. Second, instructing
the jury that voting against a party's causal negligence means
exclusion from subsequent apportionment deliberations may dis-
courage jurors from taking an absolute view of the relative negli-
gence. Third, the Ferguson decision produces the anomaly
of allowing a juror who believes a party to be one percent
negligent to participate fully in the discussion while completely
barring another juror, who would reduce the percentage only
negligibly. 53 Fourth, the rule exacerbates the confusion over the
unity or severability of the questions comprising the issue of
liability that it was purportedly designed to avoid. Despite its
protestations that the question of the existence of causal negli-
N.W. 414'(1937); Coveleski v. Thomas, 229 App. Div. 413, 242 N.Y.S.
174 (1930); Craven v. Skobba, 108 Minn. 165, 121 N.W. 625 (1909).
51. See Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P.2d 639 (1943),
cf. Johnson v. Holzemer, 263 Minn. 227, 116 N.W.2d 673 (1962); Decker
v. Schumacher, 312 Mich. 6, 19 N.W.2d 466 (1945).
52. A party might well be better off if the jurors who favor him
find some causal negligence on his part than none. At least then, since
those jurors could continue to participate in the deliberations, that party
would have the benefit of arguments tending to minimize his fault
which might otherwise not be adduced.
53. One additional problem which the court wholly overlooked is
the relationship between the exclusion of jurors from a material portion
of the deliberations and the right of the parties to participate, through
the voir dire examination, in the selection of the jury. Though the
principal purpose of voir dire is undoubtedly to protect parties from
biased jurors, each party, through this examination, seeks to install
jurors most inclined to favor his cause. Such a proceeding is an integral
and respected part of the adversary system. The effect of the court's
ruling in Ferguson is to eliminate the extremes, that is, those jurors most
inclined to favor one party or the other. The only reason to eliminate
extremes, however, is to prevent a juror's bias from having prejudicial
effects. And if true bias exists, the place for it to be recognized and
corrected is the voir dire. But once both parties and the court have
agreed that these particular 12 people are to be the ones to decide the
truth of the matter at hand, there appears to be no justifiable reason for
preventing some jurors from expressing their ideas on every matter
presented simply because their views are somewhat more extreme than
those of the majority.
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gence is inseparable from the question of apportionment,54 the
court seems to have been misled by the form in which the ques-
tions were submitted. By its own standard the court was incor-
rect when it said that "the question of apportionment is never
reached . . . until one plaintiff and one defendant have been
found causally negligent."' '5 When the jurors find only one
party causally negligent, they certainly have "apportioned" the
liability. By barring from the deliberations the one or two
jurors who do not agree that a particular party is liable the court
necessarily creates two questions where there should be only
one. Such a rule requires the jury to pass on the existence of
causal negligence as a separate question so that those jurors who
are to be excluded from the apportionment deliberations may be
identified.
These problems seem to have arisen from the court's con-
fusing form with substance and its shortsightedness as to the
purpose behind separating, in special verdicts, the question of
the existence of causal negligence from its allocation. Theo-
retically a single question is asked with respect to liability:
"Taking the total negligence of all parties which contributed as
a proximate cause of the accident as 100 percent, how much of
that total do you allocate to each of the parties?" 56 The reasons
for breaking that question down into several steps are purely
practical,57 and in any real sense the question of the existence
of causal negligence is only a part of the apportionment question.
By answering each of the interrogatories relating to the existence
of causal negligence in the affirmative, the jury merely rejects
54. 239 N.W.2d at 196.
55. Id.
56. Although the "existence" question is not logically distinct from
the apportionment question, there is an intuitive appeal for separating
the two-the question of whether a party was negligent may be easier to
answer than the question of how negligent he was. The first question is
easier, however, only when the degree of negligence is substantial. It is
not at all clear, for instance, that it is easy to distinguish between no neg-
ligence and one percent or five percent. Whatever beneficial effects
separating these questions might have for the jury, however, the distinc-
tion is all too emphemeral to warrant its use as a basis for substantive
rulings by a court.
57. See Note, Informing the Jury of the Effect of Its Answers to
Special Verdict Questions-The Minnesota Experience, 58 MnrN. L. Ray.
903 (.1974). These practical uses include checking jury prejudice and
ignorance of the law and assisting the jury to resolve complicated issues
by presenting each of the elements upon which a finding must be made
in a logical sequence. Special verdicts also serve to localize error and
eliminate the need for long, complex instructions.
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three of the potentially infinite apportionment ratios.58 Thus,
the question of liability, at least with respect to the jury's delib-
erations, is unitary, and the ,proper role of each juror is to con-
-tribute his own perceptions and experiences to the search for an
estimate of who was at fault and how that fault should be appor-
tioned. The fact that one or two jurors initially believe the
apportionment should be 0-100 percent should make no more
difference that that others believe that it should be 20-80 percent,
40-60 percent, or any other ratio.
The task of the jury in assessing liability in a negligence
action is to reach an apportionment that at least ten jurors agree
is a fair approximation of -the degree of fault attributable to each
party. When ten jurors so agree, the issue is settled. If the
other two jurors feel firmly convinced that the proportion should
be some figure other than that decided upon by the majority, they
may dissent, and indeed they are duty bound to do so. But until
that time, it is the right of the parties to have each juror retain
the ability to participate, express her own views, consider the
views of others, change her mind, and attempt to change the
minds of others. This basic duty of all twelve jurors to par-
ticipate in the discussion should never be foreclosed merely
because, in the first instance, a small minority took an absolute
view of relative fault.52
58. The three eliminated ratios would be: 0-100 percent, 100-0 per-
cent and 0-0 percent.
59. The court apparently wanted to reverse the lower court deci-
sion in Ferguson because the verdict seemed fundamentally unreason-
able given the tremendous danger to the unsuspecting public caused by
high voltage power lines and the disparity in knowledge of the danger
between the plaintiffs and defendant. See 239 N.W.2d at 193-95. The
court was forced to reject the plaintiffs' ultra-hazardous activity theory
for practical reasons, see note 1 supra, and found that the jury's verdict
was not so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to warrant an
outright reversal on that ground. As a result, the court cast about for
other grounds upon which to base a reversal, and unfortunately did not
consider these grounds as carefully as it did the ultra-hazardous activity
issue. That lack of care gave rise to a fundamentally ill-considered
decision, which may well have serious and unwarranted consequences
for future litigants.
It appears that the court can repair the damage it caused only by
overruling that portion of Ferguson dealing with the juror exclusion
issue. Though the holding on this issue was clearly unnecessary to
reversing the case, see note 44 supra, it is nevertheless a holding. It
cannot be construed as a decision on voting homogeneity, for the facts
make it clear that the voting was unobjectionable. The court must face
up to the fact that in trying to do indirectly that which it was reluctant
to do directly-that is, reverse a jury verdict as unreasonable-it estab-
lished a rule that may prove far more prejudicial than the situation it
was designed to eliminate.
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